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ALL'S NOT FAIR FOR ART IN WAR:
A PROPOSAL FOR THE EQUITABLE EXCHANGE
OF SOVIET AND GERMAN ART
PILLAGED IN WORLD WAR H
Susan H. Rothstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
In February of 1993, representatives of Germany and Russia met in Dresden
to discuss the mutual return of art' pillaged during, and immediately following,
World War I. The meeting marked the end of forty years of Soviet denial that
any pillaging by the Soviets ever took place, and the beginning of stronger amity
between Germany and Russia. As of yet, the mechanism and specifics of
repatriation have not been decided. The fact that much Soviet art has found its
way into private hands indicates that a one-for-one swap would be impossible,
and raises the question of how the trade can be conducted equitably. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union further complicates the issue.
Part II of this paper summarizes the events of World War II that gave rise to
this conflict. Part III describes the Post-World War II and Cold War period,
including the Nuremberg Trials and the 1954 Hague Convention and Protocol.
Part IV updates the reader to the February 1993, meeting in Dresden between the
Germans and the Russians, and briefly describes the continuing hostility on the
part of many Russians toward the return of art to Germany. Part V summarizes
the general prohibition on retaining or demanding art or other cultural property
as war reparations, while Part VI reviews further arguments upon which Russia
and the other former Soviet republics might be able to base a legitimate claim
for retaining at least a portion of German art. Part VII shifts the focus from
arguments for retaining German art to possible mechanisms for maximizing the
amount of Soviet art available for repatriation to the former republics, and for
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graduated cum laude from Duke University in 1990 with a degree in Russian. In the summer of
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for Study Abroad. Ms. Rothstein is currently a law clerk to the Honorable Charles R. Wilson, U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
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1. For purposes of this article, "art," "artwork," and "cultural property" will be used interchange-
ably. As renowned art law professor John H. Merryman noted in his article Two Ways of Thinking
About Cultural Propery, 80 AM. J.INT'L.L. 831, Oct. 1986, "The entire question of the proper defi-
nition of cultural property for legal and policy purposes is a large and unruly one." Id. at 831, n. 1.
Such a definition is not necessary to an understanding of this article and, therefore, "cultural proper-
ty," "art," and "artwork" are used in their general, lay sense, rather than as terms of art, as it were.
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distributing that art, or any compensation offered in its stead, upon return to the
former Soviet Union. Part VIII waxes somewhat poetic about the significance of
the return of art to its place of origin.
HI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The beginning of the Second World War found Germany and the Soviet
Union, if not allies, then at least not enemies. On August 23, 1939, the Germans
and Soviets entered into a non-aggression pact.2 The pact gave the Soviets
control over land in Europe, the potential for more control in Europe, and
immunity from direct German aggression.3 The pact gave the Germans
confidence that the Soviets would not interfere with their imperialist goals. In
1939 and early 1940, the two countries continued to enter into treaties and
economic agreements with each other.4 However, by the middle of 1940, it
became clear that direct competition between Germany and the Soviet Union for
control of Europe would be inevitable, and both parties began to show dissatis-
faction with their prior agreements.5 On December 18, 1940, Adolph Hitler
issued Directive 21, code name "Operation Barbarossa," in preparation for an
attack on the Soviets, and on June 22, 1941, without a formal declaration of war,
Germany invaded the Soviet Union.*
A branch of the German war machine was the Einsatzstab-Reichsleiter
Rosenberg (ERR), headed by Alfred Rosenberg.7 The ERR's purpose was to rob
defeated countries of their artwork, which was ultimately to be included in a
grand "Fuhrermuseum". 8 Over time, the ERR also became the personal collector
for a number of high-ranking Nazi officials, including Hermann Goring.9
Artwork from Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Belgium, and every other
subjugated country poured into Germany. 0 Although the Soviet Union never
fell to the Germans, the ERR made significant inroads there as well." Impor-
tant cities such as Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk, and Kharkov were stripped of their
art.12 During and after the Allied liberation of Europe, much of the German-
confiscated art was either stolen by Allied troops or returned to the rightful
owners. By that time, however, a good deal of Soviet art had already passed into
private German hands.
13
2. 2 Werner Hilgemann and Hermann Kinder, THE ANCHOR ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY 197
(Ernest A. Menze, trans., 1978) (1966).
3. Earl F. Ziemke, STALINGRAD TO BERLIN: THE GERMAN DEFEAT IN THE EAST, 24 (1988).
4. HILGEMANN AND KINDER, supra note 2, at 199.
5. ZIEMKE, supra note 3, at 24.
6. HILGEMANN AND KINDER, supra note 2,-at 207.
7. Charles de Jaeger, THE LINz FILE: HITLER'S PLUNDER OF EUROPE'S ART, 54 (1981).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 70.
10. Id.
11. Bruce Clark, Looted Tsarist Treasure Found at Soviet Base, THE TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991.
12. Id.
13. Germany and Russia Talk About Returning Art Stolen in War, THE REUTER LIBR. REP., Feb. 2
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Soviet troops also did their share of looting during the war. However, one
commentator has suggested that actual wartime looting of Germany was done on
an individual level, with little or no direction from commanding officers. 4 It
was not until the war ended that Stalin had his own "treasure collectors," the
Committee of Arts of the Council of Peoples Commissars, whose duty was to
strip Germany of its art in punishment for damage to the Soviet Union.15 Stalin,
confident in the Soviets' right to take German art as reparations, openly
displayed it throughout the Soviet Union immediately following the war."6 Soon
after, most of it disappeared.' 7
ImI. POST-WORLD WAR II & THE COLD WAR
A. Nuremberg
At the end of the war, the victorious allies held the Nuremberg Trials, at
which Rosenberg was a defendant.' His crimes included participating in the
destruction and looting of Soviet art:
2. Eastern Countries:
During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German Government and
the German High Command carried out, as a systematic policy, a continuous
course of plunder and destruction ....
The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy museums of
Leningrad, Smolensk, Novgorod, Poltava, and others.
In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov museum were
seized.
Stealing of huge dimensions was typified in Kiev. A large number of artis-
tic productions and valuables of different kinds were stolen and carried away.
Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga. 19
As a result of his participation in the looting of Europe, Rosenberg was
executed.20 Stalin, with his hidden cache of German art, went unpunished.
10, 1993.
14. DE JAEGER, supra note 7, at 150.
15. Geraldine Norman. Collecting: Memories of the World's Greatest Art Pillage Linger On, THE
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 27, 1991 at 45; Helen Womack, Old Masters Unearthed in the Soviet Union,
THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 28, 1991 at 13.
16. Norman, supra note 15; Eleanor Randolph, The Soviet Stonewall on Nazi Art, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 1991 at Dl.
17. Womack, supra note 15.
18. 1 ALBERT E. ELSEN AND JOHN H. MERRYMAN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 20 (2d
ed. 1987). The Nuremberg Trials were held from 1945 to 1946, during which 24 major war criminals
were tried by Allied judges. HJLGEMANN & KINDER, supra note 2. at 249.
19. Indictment IN THE NUREMBERG TRIALS. TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (Nuremberg, 1948) Vol. 1, pp. 29, 55-56, 58-60. quoted in
MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at 21-22.
20. Id. at Vol. 22, pp. 469-470, 484-486, 539-541, 588; quoted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra
note 18, at 23.
1993]
3
Rothstein: All's Not Fair for Art in War: A Proposal for the Equitable Excha
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
B. The 1954 Hague Convention and Protocol
International disgust over the rampant looting and destruction of art during
World War II, coupled with the realization that existing international law was no
longer adequate to protect cultural property from belligerence,2 paved the way
for the 1954 Hague Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict. The German Democratic Republic,
The Federal Republic of Germany, and the Soviet Union were among the
signatories to the Convention and Protocol.' Article 4 of the Convention
provides, in pertinent part:
2. The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if
necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and
any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property. They shall refrain from
requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High
Contracting Party.23
Article I of the Protocol provides:
2. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to return, at the close of the
hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory previously occupied,
cultural property which is in its territory, if such property has been exported in
contravention of the princilie [laid down earlier]. Such property shall never be
retained as war reparations.
However, the Convention and Protocol apparently were not viewed as retroac-
tive by the Soviet Union, which refused to even admit any knowledge of German
art looted by Red Army soldiers or other instruments of the Soviet Union.'
Although the Soviets occasionally returned certain pieces of art to Germany,
such as Khrushchev's returning the Pergamon Altar and some art taken from
Dresden,2 6 they continued their official denial for almost forty years.27
IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
It was not until 1991 that the policy of denial came to an end.28 When Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin visited Germany in November of that year, he
agreed to discuss the issue of stolen art.2 9 In doing so, he essentially ratified the
21. John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM.J.INT'L. L. 831,
835 (1986).
22. Convention for the Protection of all Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 2040 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
23. Id., quoted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at 29.
24. Id.
25. Paul Taylor, New Hope for Return of Art Treasures Now That the Cold War Over, THE
RE TER LIBR. REP., July 11, 1991.
26. Karl Meyer, Editorial Notebook: The Lost Spoils of Hitler's War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990.
§4, at 12.
27. Adrian Bridge, Rare Books Close Chapter of Plunder, THE INDEPENDENT, July 28. 1991, at
10; Taylor, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. Germany and Russia to Discuss Return of Art Treasures, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 9,
[Vol. IV:35
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spirit of the 1990 German-Soviet Friendship Treaty,3 ° which had been signed in
November of 1990, ratified by the Soviets in March of 1991, 3" and ratified by
the Germans on April 25, 1991.32 The treaty provided, inter alia, for the return
of missing or illegally deported treasures of art on the two sides' respective
territories.33 The fact that Soviet historians were increasingly revealing details
of German treasures hidden in secret vaults may have influenced Yeltsin's de-
cision to support the treaty.34 In December, 1991, Yeltsin's commitment to the
treaty was guaranteed when the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent
States - which at that time consisted of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine - de-
clared that they would fulfill "international obligations from treaties and agree-
ments of the former U.S.S.R."
35
In February 1993, in further endorsement of the treaty, Germany and Russia
met in Dresden to discuss the return to Germany of thousands of pieces of art
pillaged at the end of World War ]I.36 On February 10, German Interior
Minister Rudolf Seiters and Russian Culture Minister Yevgeny Sidorov agreed to
set up a joint commission to locate these works and facilitate their return to
Germany.37 However, some Russians do not take kindly to any return of art to
Germany. They have denounced Yeltsin as treasonous for planning to return
"war trophies paid for with precious Russian blood. 35
Such statements are not surprising, considering how deeply the memory of
World War II runs in the Russian psyche. Estimates of Soviets killed during the
war range from twenty to thirty million.39 Signs instructing people on which
side of the street to stand during an air raid are still posted along Nevsky
Prospect, the main street in St. Petersburg. 4 Every May, there is a parade in
Red Square commemorating the allied victory over the fascists.4 While the end
of the Cold War might diffuse some of this obsession with the past, it is unlikely
1993.
30. Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation, Nov. 9, 1990, F.R.G. - U.S.S.R,
30 I.L.M. 504 [hereinafter Friendship Treaty].
31. Germany, Soviet Union Ready to Talk About Swapping Seized Art, THE REUTER LIBR. REP.,
Apr. 23, 1991.
32. Art Treaty, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 27, 1991, at 8.
33. Friendship Treaty, supra note 30. Article 16 of the Friendship Treaty provides:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the United Soviet Socialist Republic will advocate
the preservation of cultural treasures of the other side in their territory.
They agreed that lost or unlawfully transferred art treasures which are located in their
territory will be returned to their owners or their successors.
34. Clark, supra note 11.
35. Text of Declarations by 3 Republic Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9. 1991, at A4.
36. Germany and Russia to Discuss Return of Art Treasures, supra note 29.
37. Id.
38. Russia Admits it has Treasures Taken from Germany During War; Nations Hope to Exchange
Thousands of Priceless Works. OTTAWA CITZEN, Feb. 11, 1993, at A7.
39. ZIMKE, supra note 3, at 500.
40. The author witnessed this while studying in the U.S.S.R. in 1989.
41. Id.
1993]
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to do away with it, especially among the older generation. The sense of betrayal
and hatred lingers. As former Soviet Cultural Minister Nikolai Gubenko said, "I
should say I'm sorry to those who shot my father down and hanged my
mother?"42
As to Soviet art, Russians claim that at least 200,000 works were plundered
before the Nazis were driven out of the Soviet Union, and that those works are
still missing.43 This presents a special problem, since, unlike German art which
was mostly hidden in Soviet museums, pillaged Soviet art was often sold to
private collectors, making it almost impossible to locate.' Although the 1990
treaty provided that neither side would demand compensation for the theft,
41
Germany might consider offering Russia financial compensation for the lost
works. 46 However, given the amount of economic aid Germany has already
given to the former Soviet republics, some diplomats have hinted that Russia
should not seek more.47
Some Russians have no desire to seek financial compensation for lost art.
Instead, they see German art as the only satisfactory compensation. This
sentiment is reflected in the statements of Russia's Vice-Minister of Culture,
Tatyana Nikitina: "Our position could change if Germany returns everything that
was taken illegally from our country and compensates us for our losses. Not with
sausages, of course, but with masterpieces ... We did not invite the Germans to
attack and occupy our country, so for them it is a well-deserved punishment.',4
The fact that much of the art the Nazis pillaged from the Soviet Union is now
virtually untraceable - making a one-to-one swap impossible - creates
sympathy for the position that retention of at least some German artwork is only
fair. The currently severe problem with smuggling49 could also intensify support
for this position. Resources are currently inadequate to cope with the massive
black market in artwork from the former Soviet bloc.5° As of February 1992,
Russian customs officials reported that only about ten percent of "cultural
contraband" is stopped at the Russian border.5 Sometimes, the aft leaves in the
luggage of diplomats or other officials.52 The smuggling networks are quite
extensive, 3 and, to add insult to injury, much of the art is funnelled through
Germany.'
42. Randolph, supra note 16.
43. Germany and Russia Talk About Returning Art Stolen in War, supra note 13.
44. Id.
45. Bonn, Moscow to Swap Art Stolen in WW 11, CHi. TRiB., Feb. 11, 1993, at 4.
46. Germany and Russia Talk About Returning Art Stolen in War, supra note 13.
47. Sleazy Icons, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 105.
48. Id.
49. Valuable Antiques "Emigrating" From Russia, TAss, Feb. 12, 1992.
50. Sleazy Icons, supra note 47.
51. Valuable Antiques "Emigrating" From Russia, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Art Hemorrhage in the East, WASH. PosT, Mar. 1992 at A2. 6
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V. ART AS REPARATION
While the hostility toward repatriation is understandable, there is little support
for it in international law. As exemplified by the 1954 Hague Convention and
Protocol, the general position is that cultural treasures may not be kept or
demanded as war reparations. 5 When the Western Allies demanded war repara-
tions from Germany, art was not among them. 6 Even Soviet art experts insisted
on returning artwork pillaged during World War II, denouncing the notion that it
should serve as some sort of compensation for suffering as "morally ground-
less." s7 Other commentators agree with this position, stating, for example, "[ilt
would be reasonable to require reparations for lost treasures, but to use treasures
as reparations is contrary to the principles of international law, violates the
Hague Conventions of 1907, and makes the United Nations no better than the
Nazis. 'S
Despite the general distaste for using art as war reparations, there has been at
least one occasion on which a country has been forced to make "restitution by
replacement. 5 9 At the end of World War I, Germany was required under the
Treaty of Versailles to replace items lost in the burning of the library of Louvain
with its own, comparable property. 60 However, when Poland sought to effec-
tuate a similar result immediately after World War H1, its request was denied.61
Perhaps Germany's reaction to the demoralization it suffered after World War I
made the Allies think twice about again exacting reparations so inextricably en-
twined with the country's morale.62
VI. OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING POSSESSION
A. Meyer and The Human Past
Even if Russia cannot legitimately claim the art as war reparations, other
arguments can be made for retaining at least some of it. Consider Karl E.
Meyer's three views of the human past: the Collector's view, the Curator's view,
and the Byronic (nationalist) view.63
55. Hague Convention, supra note 22.
56. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at 43.
57. M. Murzina, Art Experts Want Account Settled, RUSSIAN PRESS DIGEST, Nov. 7, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
58. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at 43.
59. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188 (hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles].
60. Id.
61. 3 PJ. O'Keefe & Lyndel V. Prott, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE, 828-829 (1989).
62. See generally Douglas Rigby, Cultural Reparations and a New Western Tradition, 13 AM.
SCHOLAR, No. 3, pp. 273, 278-284, reproduced in part in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at
41-42.
Cultural property apparently was not among the reparations the Western allies sought from
Germany after World War I. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at 43, citing "Berlin (Potsdam)
Convention" from TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACrs SERIES 3 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, 1945: 1213, 1231.)
63. Karl E. Meyer, THE PLUNDERED PAST: THE STORY OF THE ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC
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The defining characteristic of Meyer's Collector, besides the need to satisfy
his desire for personal ownership, is the idea that he must protect and preserve
what would otherwise be neglected.' The proposition that art should remain
with the party that will better protect it, even if that party took possession, at
least arguably, illegally, is often associated with the Elgin Marbles controver-
sy.6 The general consensus seems to be that had the Marbles not been removed
from Greece, they might very well have been destroyed, either by war or
pollution.66 Therefore, the argument in favor of keeping the Marbles in England
is that England has the capacity to better protect them. This argument loses
ground as Greece increasingly demonstrates it is now capable of taking care of
the Marbles.
As former Soviet Cultural Minister Gubenko noted when asked if the Soviet
leadership would apologize to the Germans for the theft, "Britain ha[s] not
apologized for the Elgin Marbles."'67 However, as much as Gubenko would like
to characterize the situations as comparable, they are not. Whereas England has
- or, at least, had - a legitimate position from the Collector's perspective, the
Russians do not. In general, cultural property stored in the Soviet Union has not
been well protected. 68 Books and artwork that have not disintegrated have been
otherwise damaged by rodents and the elements. 69 Because the Russians have
failed in what the Collector sees as the ultimate task, they would not be justified
in retaining the German art in the collector's eyes.
The Russians likewise would be unable to justify retaining the art to Meyer's
Curator. "The Curator's commitment is to the public,"7 but German art in Rus-
sia has been kept far from the public. Many pillaged treasures, including books
and gold, as well as artwork, have been stored in churches, warehouses, and the
basements of museums and universities, while others have adorned the dachas of
high-ranking government officials since the end of the war.7' Had the art been
prominently displayed in the Soviet Union, accessible to all interested, an
argument .for retention could perhaps be made. However, considering that
accessibility to the Soviet Union itself, let alone to the art in its museums, was
IN WORKS OF ART, 179 (1977).
64. Id. at 187.
65. The Elgin Marbles are sculptures which were removed from the parthenon between 1801 and
1812 and shipped to England where they have remained ever since. John H. Merryman, Thinking
About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1882. They are so named for the person who
commissioned their removal, Thomas Bruce, seventh Earl of Elgin, who was British Ambassador to
the Ottoman Empire of which Greece was then a part. Id. Greece has repeatedly sought the marbles'
return. Id.
66. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 18, at 13.
67. William Millinship, USSR: Moscow Seeks Deal With Germany on Art Loot, OBSERVER, Oct.
27, 1991.
68. Murzina, supra note 57.
69. Womack, supra note 15.
70. Meyer, supra note 26, at 191.
71. Womack, supra note 15; Helen Womack, Stalin's Art Plunder Traced in Secret Video, THE
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 28, 1991, at 1; Bonn and Moscow Negotiate Over Return of World War I Stolen
Art, AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, Feb. 10, 1993; Randolph, supra note 16.
[Vol. IV:35
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narrowly restricted during the Cold War, any hope the Russians might have of
relying on past action to satisfy the Curator would be ill-founded.
Byron72, himself, would probably be appalled by the very idea of the Rus-
sians failing to return all of Germany's art, for the precise reason that it is still
Germany's art. The nationalist views cultural property as part of a national
cultural heritage.7 3 This view is the basis upon which repatriation is presumed
legitimate and desirable.74 Even disregarding major German cultural treasures,
such as the first edition Gutenberg Bibles,75 the thousands of pieces of German
art looted at the end of World War II have never lost their identity as part of
Germany's cultural history. Unlike the Elgin Marbles - and perhaps only
because German art has not been in the Soviet Union and Russia for as long as
the Marbles have been in England - the looted art has not become part of the
Soviet or Russian cultural heritage. For that reason, Byron's nationalist would, in
true Byronic fashion, vociferously condemn a refusal to repatriate the art to
Germany.
The counter to the nationalist's position is that of the internationalist, a
position shaped by Francis Lieber, a professor at Columbia College, who, during
the United States Civil War, proposed a code of conduct for belligerent
forces.76 The preamble to the 1954 Hague Convention illustrates Lieber's
philosophy:77
Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world;
Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance
for all peoples of the world and that it is important that this heritage should
receive international protection ...."
Art, then, is the birthright of all humanity. It follows that the identity of the
party with actual, physical possession of art would be immaterial because art
belongs to everyone. The internationalist would probably be satisfied to have
German art remain in Russia, appropriately displayed and accessible, with
finances and other resources contributed by Germany, if not by the entire inter-
national community. The internationalist's view is thus the one most favorable to
Russia's retention of German art, but, by the same token, it favors letting
Germany keep and display, with the same international support, art taken from
the Soviets. The internationalist view, while having its moment in the spotlight in
72. Lord Byron (born 1788, died 1824) was an English poet who wrote two poems condemning
Elgin for his removal of the marbles, "The Curse of Minerva" and "Childe Harolde". MERRYMAN &
ELSEN, supra note 18, at 12-13, comment 1.
73. Merryman, supra note 21, at 832.
74. Id.
75. Anna Tomforde, Germans Aim to Recover Treasures in Russia, THE CALGARY HERALD, Feb.
It, 1993. at C1.
76. Merryman, supra note 22, at 833.
77. Id.
78. Hague Convention, supra note 22.
19931
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1954, has not enjoyed continued support.79 Subsequent pronouncements of
international law and policy have returned to a more nationalist perspective.'s
B. Challenging Russian Authority to Return the Art
Rather than suggesting that the Russians have the right to keep the art, one
might argue that they lack the authority to return it. Such an argument is
especially useful for other former Soviet republics. As indicated above, damage
to, and pillage of, cultural property was extensive throughout the entire Soviet
Union. Therefore, the former republics could argue that the art that Yeltsin is
now committed to returning to the Germans is not, or at least is not exclusively,
Russia's to return. This particularly applies to artwork currently located in
republics other than Russia, over which Yeltsin and the Russian government
have no legal authority. However, the Ukraine and Belarus are likely precluded
from making such a claim, as they were part of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent states at the time Yeltsin indicated the Commonwealth's commitment to all
Soviet treaties."'
Those republics that joined the Commonwealth after the declaration are also
arguably bound by the declaration. These republics include all of the former
Soviet republics except Georgia. 2 Such an argument is based on the idea that,
in joining the Commonwealth, the republics assented to being bound by its
terms, including those terms that were agreed upon before they joined. Unless it
could be shown that a particular republic explicitly refused upon joining to be
bound by this pledge, it is unlikely that a Commonwealth member state could
escape obligation.
As to Georgia and, because they too were dominated by Soviet-backed
communist regimes, the Baltic States, the argument that they should be bound by
the Commonwealth's pledge is as difficult to make as the argument that the
other republics should be bound is easy. By never joining the Commonwealth,
this former republic and formerly-controlled regions have clearly manifested an
intent not to be bound by the Commonwealth's actions. Therefore, the actions of
the Commonwealth as a whole, or of any one of its leaders, could not reasonably
be said to bind Georgia or the Baltic States.
However, the question remains whether these groups could be bound to the
1990 German-Soviet Friendship Treaty, which the Soviets ratified in March of
19918 The Baltic States declared their independence from the Soviet regime in
79. Tomforde, supra note 75, at 846.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying note 29.
82. Azerbaijan's membership in the Commonwealth, previously intermittent, is now solidified.
Azerbaijan Now Officially CIS Member, AGENCE FRANcE PRESSE, Sept. 24, 1993. Azerbaijan's first
post-Soviet era leader, Ayaz Mutalibov, signed a Commonwealth membership treaty in December,
1991. Id. In October, 1992, the Azeri parliament, under the leadership of pro-Turkish president
Abulfaz Elchibey, refused to ratify the treaty. Id. Since then, however, the leadership of Azerbaijan
has again changed, and the country is an official member of the Commonwealth. Id.
83. Friendship Treaty, supra note 30.
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1989, so in no way could they be bound by a Soviet obligation incurred after
that date. Georgia is also free from obligation under the treaty because,
theoretically, only the successor to the Soviet Union's power could potentially be
automatically bound to the Soviet Union's obligations. Considering Georgia in
the role of successor to the Soviet Union is irrational. Georgia does not have a
great deal of influence over the social or economic development of the Soviet
Union and, thus, does not have legitimate claim to what remains of the Soviets'
broad power and authority. Since Georgia is not heir to the Soviets' power, it is
not heir to the Soviets' responsibilities. Therefore, Georgia is not bound by any
agreements with Germany except for those which it enters into or ratifies on its
own behalf.
Georgia and the former Baltic States are thus the only formerly-controlled
Soviet areas that may be able to challenge Russia's authority to return German
art. In this case, the Baltic States' challenge is weaker than that of Georgia.
Originally, the intent behind taking German art, according to Stalin, was to
compensate for the suffering of the Soviets during World War II. However, the
Baltic States were never internationally accepted as part of the Soviet Union nor
ever truly considered "Soviet."'  Therefore, the intended exchange of art
between former republics and Germany should be none of their concern, some-
thing from which they neither benefit nor suffer. They are free to enter into their
own agreements for the return of pillaged art, whether by Germany or anyone
else.
As a former Soviet republic, Georgia could challenge the return of German art
or argue that it should receive compensation for art repatriated without its per-
mission. However, because international law dictates that Georgia should return
any pillaged art, even absent a treaty, its arguments would likely fall on deaf
ears. Consequently, it would behoove Georgia to take advantage of the existing
agreement if at all possible.
VII. BRINGING SovIET ART HOME (WHEREVER THAT MIGHT BE)
The fact that multiple republics are involved in the exchange of art between
Germany and the former Soviet Union raises the following questions: 1) how to
distribute any financial or other forms of compensation among the republics and
2) how to distribute recovered Soviet art. The first question is best answered in
conjunction with the second question. Of course, the second question presumes
that a significant amount of Soviet art will be recovered. Given the difficulty in
tracing pillaged Soviet art in Germany, it is questionable whether any significant
amount of Soviet art will actually find its way back to the former Soviet Union.
Up to this point, we have looked at ways to protect the former Soviet repub-
lics, especially Russia, from an inequitable exchange of pillaged art by prevent-
ing some German art from going back to Germany. Under international law, the
arguments for that position are few and weak. However, we now look at the
84. The international community recognized that the areas were administered by the Soviets, but
the West refused to recognize them as legally part of the Soviet Union.
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prospects of resolving the inequality by maximizing the amount of Soviet art
available for repatriation.
A. Private Actions for Recovery
One way to recover Soviet art from Germany is on an individual basis. The
typical scenario would be as follows: a citizen of one of the republics discovers
the location of pillaged art in which he or she has an interest. According to some
international law commentators, military occupation and seizure alone do not
extinguish original title in property. 5 Therefore, it is certainly possible that the
citizen of a former Soviet republic would still have title to artwork taken by the
Nazis. The citizen would then bring an individual suit demanding return of the
artwork. However, bringing individual suits would probably not be an efficient
way to recover large quantities of Soviet art. First, there is the possibility, albeit
very slight, that suits based on the illegality of the Nazis' actions would be
barred under some type of Act of State Doctrine since the Soviet Union
recognized and dealt with the Nazi regime as the legitimate government of
Germany. Because it has its roots in principles of international equality and
sovereignty,86 the former Soviet republics probably observe some version of the
doctrine. However, even if they do, a consideration of all factors would likely
lead to the conclusion that the doctrine is inapplicable to the Nazi confiscation of
Soviet art. Second, although the suit presumably could be brought, the Soviet
system, unlike the American system, did not encourage private legal actions; this
tradition may be difficult to overcome. Third, the chances are remote that all, or
even most, of the art will eventually be recovered through private discovery and
action. While one might be hard-pressed to hide the Amber Chamber 7 in one's
closet, icons and other works of art are easy to conceal. Unless the art is publicly
displayed in Germany, it is doubtful that a stolen piece will ever come to the
attention of an interested party.
B. Public Action
Another option is for government representatives of the former republics to
undertake their own investigations into the whereabouts of Soviet art in
Germany. However, even if the governments were to work closely together, such
action might quickly encroach upon the territory of the German authorities and
85. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, 816 (Sup. Ct. 1966), citing 35 AM. J. INT'L. L., 666, 667
(Oct. 1941).
86. MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note 18, at 26.
87. The Amber Chamber is a collection of amber wall panels, furniture and other ornaments
given to Peter the Great by King Fredrick the First of Prussia in the early 18th Century. Stephen
Kinzer, Yeltsin says Lost Czarist Treasure is Traced, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, sec. 1, col. 1, pg.
16. It disappeared from Catharine's Palace in St. Petersburg toward the end of World War II. Bruce
Clark, Looted Tsarist Treasure Found at Soviet Base, THE TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991.
Even though the collection was made in Prussia, it has become one of Russia's cultural trea-
sures. Id.
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cool relations between the countries. Furthermore, such a strategy would lead to
the problem of determining which former republic would be entitled to certain
pieces of recovered art. For example, if the Ukrainian delegation found some-
thing known to have been taken from Russia, who would be entitled to
possession of the piece? The problem becomes especially thorny if a particularly
valuable piece is recovered. A hands-on approach by the republics is therefore
not desirable.
Another way to return Soviet art to the former Soviet Union would be for
German authorities to take it upon themselves to search for Soviet art. Of course,
this, too, is limited by the fact that German authorities cannot go from house to
house searching for artwork. The bottom line is that if the German owner of
Soviet art does not want it to be discovered, it will not be. Therefore, any
effective mechanism for coaxing Soviet art out from German basements and
back to the former republics would have to be one that encourages Germans to
bring Soviet art to the proper German authorities. One possibility is to offer a
percentage of the art's value as a "finder's fee." However, considering the nature
of some of the art - the Amber Chamber, for instance - this could prove
prohibitively expensive. Another, more realistic alternative, is to offer tax
incentives. Finally, a flat-out appeal to human decency is always worth a try.
C. Whose Art?
The next question is to whom would the German authorities relinquish the
art? One possibility is to set up a central authority, consisting of representatives
from all the former republics, to distribute the art. This would be the most
efficient mechanism for distribution and would ensure that each republic's
interests would be represented. Furthermore, because it would have a limited
purpose, the authority would not prompt any fears of a resurgence of the central-
ized government that characterized the former Soviet Union.
Once a piece of Soviet artwork comes under the control of this authority, it
must somehow be distributed. One option is to distribute the art to the former
republics alternatively, i.e., Russia gets this piece, Ukraine gets the next piece,
and so on. The fact that this scheme is arbitrary is both its strongest and weakest
point. No one could claim that any former republic is getting preferential
treatment, but there is no guarantee that a republic will receive something of
significance to its cultural heritage. The basis for wanting Soviet art returned is
not that the former republics just want more art; they want their art. This attitude
reflects the dominance of the Byronic perspective in human nature, and goes to
the heart of "cultural property." A system which could conceivably award the
ubiquitous Amber Chamber to the Kirghiz, even if the Kirghiz promised to have
it prominently displayed, is not a system which would enjoy much support.
The distribution system must therefore attempt to connect a particular piece of
art to a particular former republic if at all possible. For the most part, this should
not be as difficult as it sounds, considering that many of the former republics
have distinct languages, artistic styles, cultural influences, and religions. For
those cases in which classification is difficult, there should be an arbitration
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proceeding by which interested parties can state their positions and present
evidence to support them.
As mentioned earlier, there remains the question of how financial and other
forms of compensation for unrecoverable art would be distributed among the
former republics. Once again, for efficiency and equitability, the money should
initially be channelled through a central authority. However, the process of dis-
tributing money is much more complicated than the process of distributing art
because money is not inherently designated for a particular former republic.
Dividing the money equally among the former republics to use at their own
discretion is one possibility. Another possibility is to place all money into a
general fund for the former republics to use to facilitate preservation of any
artwork that is returned. Any other forms of aid would also be imputed to this
general fund. From an artistic standpoint, the latter is more desirable. However,
considering the current economic needs of the individual former republics,
distribution of unencumbered funds might carry the day.
D. What is to be Done? - A Summary of Strategy
The key to successfully and equitably carrying out the provisions of the
agreement between Russia and Germany is to go all out. All of the former Soviet
republics should garner their resources to collect state-held art and return it to
Germany. For its part, the German government should cooperate with the former
republics by offering incentives for German individuals to come forward with
Soviet art and notifying the proper authorities when Soviet art is found on the
German market. Once the art is returned to a centralized authority, distribution
must also be carried out equitably. For the former Soviet republics, this means
that art which can be attributed to a particular former republic should be returned
to that republic. Financial and other forms of compensation for lost art should be
equally divided among the former republics or equally accessible to them. In this
way, all parties share the obligations and rewards, and the chance of undue
hardship or unjust enrichment for any party is minimized.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Il-will still exists between Germany and the former Soviet republics. The
suffering of World War II is not easily forgotten by either side. That is one
reason why their exchange of pillaged art is so important. Returning pillaged art
restores the dignity and cultural integrity of the country pillaged; it symbolizes
the end to an ongoing hostility. To return art to a country is to recognize, or be
forced to recognized, the validity of that country's existence and its cultural
heritage and to acknowledge, or be forced to acknowledge, that country as an
equal. Returning pillaged art from a war almost fifty years ended would bring
Germany and the former republics one step closer to putting their past behind
them. Perhaps art might satisfy some people as war reparations, but that does not
come close to the reward of a lasting peace and trust.
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